Abstract
Introduction
The ability to measure QoS parameters is important to detect service violations and to contain attacker's sabotages in the internet [1, 2] . The sophisticated attackers exploit the security vulnerabilities included in the open structure of the internet to perform their attacks. They tend to use the network traffic in order to hide their malicious traffic by mixing them with the normal network traffic. Some of them use DDoS, worms, Network scan and SYN flooding attacks in order to perform service violations and bandwidth theft. Such attacks have difficult challenges to prognosis the true positive i.e. the challenges of dropping the malicious traffic without exceeding that to the legitimated traffic. Current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are unable to effectively remedy such challenges; however, some efficient research trend to study the breaching in the quality of services (QoS) parameters to identify and classify network attacks such as [3] [4] [5] [6] . The philosophy of these researches is that QoS parameters which basically used to measure the network performance can also be used to determine whether that performance is normal or not.
In this paper we propose a potent model for unwanted traffic detection in QoS edge-to-edge domain networks. The purpose of this study was to present an effective solution for the above attacks challenges considering the drawbacks of recent IDS approaches. Currently, it will focus on detecting the unwanted traffic injection and identifying which user it has been generated by. Hence, monitoring the users who abuse the network resources is required to differentiate between wanted and unwanted traffic.
Customers of DiffServ edge-to-edge QoS in multi-domain network have a Service Level Agreement (SLA) for packet loss, delay, jitter and bandwidth guarantees provided by their Internet Service Provider (ISP) [7, 8] . The customer who exceeds its guaranteed ratio will despoil others' ratios. That is why; QoS parameters should be inspected at domain edges in order to prevent network resources exhaustion. In this paper, packet loss check is ignored. Our vision is to suffice by measuring jitter and bandwidth. These parameters can be measured more accurately. Jitter is aggregated for each user and compared with its guarantees in the SLA. When the user violates his jitter guarantee in SLA, the throughput will be computed as user transfer rate to verify the services violations and to identify the user who is behind these violations.
The main contribution of this paper is letting the decision which confirms whether the services guarantees are violated or not based on jitter metric measurement. In fact, delay jitter is measured to correct the errors which are caused by using inaccurate methods for delay measuring. Actually, these methods include drawbacks such as: non-synchronization when timestamp of props packets is recorded between sender and receiver edges or the asymmetrical links if we simply measure RTT and divide it by two.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and related work. In Section 3, we review the impacts of unwanted traffic on QoS parameters. Section 4 classifies the unwanted traffic. Section 5 describes the architecture and algorithm of SLA violation. Section 6 debates the metrics (delay, jitter and bandwidth) measurement. Section 7 presents simulation results. In section 8, the conclusion and future work are introduced. Finally, the acknowledgment is written in section 9.
Background and Related Work
IDS are classified into known attack based, and unknown attack based. The known attack based detectors are defined as a set of rules written to examine the network traffic in order to inspect the known attacks characteristics such as [9] [10] [11] . These IDS detectors also called a misuse or signature bases. Their main drawback is the need for adding new rules when a new type of attack is discovered. The unknown attack detectors are described as anomaly based detection systems in [12] [13] [14] [15] . Though these types can detect a suspicious traffic, they can not give a complete diagnosis about the attack nature. In addition, the possibility of normal traffic deviation from its distribution model which is created first leads to rise the false alarms generation.
There have been a number of related studies tended to measure the imbalance and breaches that occur in the QoS parameters to detect the service violations or to portend the resources theft. [6] , [16] and Ahsan H, Mohamed H and Bharat B [17] propose a scalable system for detecting service violations and bandwidth theft in DiffServ edge to edge domain. This approach is simple and useful for investigation SLA violations; however, its shortcoming by relying the delay firstly to detect service violations. As it measures one way delay (OWD) by using the timestamps recorded at both ends. According to [18] , OWD is hard to measure by simply sending probes from the source to the destination. Besides, the probe-packet stream adds considerable extra-amount traffic on the network and thus produces a QoS performance that is not similar to that without the influence of the probe-packet. In addition, the method of determining the probability with which the probe packets should be injected is not accurate [6] . Moreover, the core-assisted scheme for loss measurement is not useful and difficult to deploy, added to the ambiguity in determining its loss threshold. [18] , propose a non-synchronized One-way queuing delay measurement and its application on detecting DDoS attack. To avoid the synchronization problem resulting from recording the timestamp at both ends, the intervals are separately measured at the sender and the receiver to compute OWD. This approach is limited only to measure packet loss rate, OWD and jitter without propose a complete mechanism to detect attacks and identify their sources. [5] present a real-time detection and containment of network attacks using QoS Regulation. The network attack detector is designed based on monitoring the increase of the input traffic by each protocol. Each protocol has two kinds of threshold: high and low threshold. When the traffic volume of the corresponding protocol significantly exceeds a regulation high threshold or is below the low threshold, the detector declares anomalies and then the system switches to class-based buffer management techniques. The use of non class-based buffer management during the normal time mode to avoid the wasting in the system resources is one advantage of these approaches. In addition, classifying the traffic according to the corresponding protocol will help later in recognizing the attacks types. On the other hand these regulation-based systems contain drawbacks such as: the possibility of training this approach to accept anomaly traffic as legitimate traffic. Also the protocols thresholds themselves are difficult to assign by the values which ensure reduction in the false alarm rates. [3] , propose a similar approach of Garga and Reddy to detect network attacks using QoS regulation. Furthermore, this approach doesn't explain feasible mechanisms for monitoring the input traffic and classifying the traffic according to the corresponding protocol.
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Unwanted traffic impact on QoS metrics
Quality of service (QoS) concept is a set of mechanisms designed to capably manage the network characteristics in order to guarantee high quality performance in the network services. The network characteristics are defined by QoS parameters which include bandwidth, Delay, Jitter and Loss [19, 20] . These parameters which we use to detect anomalous activities in the traffic are briefly described in table 1.
The network is in normal state as long as the ratios of the above QoS parameters are normal. Hereby, in this paper, we consider the violation in these parameters ratios occurring by anomalous activities in the network traffic.
Table 1. Quality of Service (QoS) parameters
In fact in addition to malformed traffic, most of anomalous traffic in the network is caused by attackers and intruders activities. Figure. When there is bandwidth consumption, there is a decrease in the data transfer rate through network paths in a time unit; thus, there is a delay in the transmission time.  Jitter: Resulting from the changes in delay for a pair of packets selected within a flow in the evaluation interval.  Data Loss: Some packets are dropped by routers because of the congestion caused by the malicious traffic or in case of the delay caused by that congestion.
Unwanted traffic classification
Unwanted traffic classification is required for identifying the kind of traffic which is behind service violations in the network. We quarantine the injected traffics which cause the amplification in the network as unwanted traffic.
Figure 2. unwanted traffic classification
Unwanted traffic can not be solely counted as malicious traffic. Figure 2 shows that unwanted traffic is categorized into three kinds: malicious, unsolicited and malformed traffics. Malicious traffic is injected by attackers for evil purposes such as DDoS, worms, SYN flooding or network scans attacks. The profit and commerce purposes are behind the unsolicited traffic injection such as spam or cookies; whereas malformed traffic is generated because of network tools malfunction. 
Architecture for detecting SLA breach
QoS Parameters
Bandwidth
Traffic rate that can be carried from source to destination in a given time period (mostly one second).
Delay
The delay in data transmission from one point to another.
Jitter
The change in delay for a pair of packets selected within a flow in the evaluation interval.
Loss
The ratio of packets dropped by the routers (lost packets).
International Journal of Digital Content Technology and its Applications Volume 4, Number 2, April 2010 MU functionality is monitoring the anomaly activities in the network traffic. It measures packets delay at the provider edges for every user and reporting that to RMU. RMU computes the jitters of each user in order to compare them with their jitter guarantees in the SLA. To verify whether services are violated or not, bandwidth gurantees should be measured. VU functionality is to measure the data transfer rate for those users who breache their jitter gurantees at provider egress edges and then forward the amount of consumed bandwidth to RMU.
Tactically bandwidth checking will not be executed before jitter guarantee has already been breached. In other words, bandwidth is defined as data transfer rate for the user at time unit, which means that any breach in delay guarantees changes data transfer time and then affects data transfer rate. Hence, users who breache their bandwidth guarantees too, will be declared as unwanted network generators.
RMU is the control and managment unit. It is seen as the heart in the body. In addition to the responsiblity of distributing the roles among the units and assigning priority for the tactical tasks, RMU computes the average numbers of jitter and consumed bandwidth for each user depending on data given by the related units. Besides, RMU is responsible of making the crucial decisions which determines whether services are breached and bandwidth are thieved or not. Figure.4 shows service violationss and bandwidth theft detection algorithm which is executed for jitter and bandwidth metrics on DiffServ domain.
DU is responsible for classifying the unwanted traffic which is behind service violations into malicious, unsolicited and malformed traffic. Actually traffic classification is out of this paper scope, that is why DU is only planned to be studied later in the next paper. The negative effect of traffic classification overload in the performance parameter can be avoided firstly by zooming out the classification scope into the traffic which has been already proved as unwanted traffic. Secondly, by collecting the information of unwanted traffic and placing them in a repository. Then executing the operation of classification in the offline way.
QoS parameters measurement
Customers of end-to-end QoS in multi-domain Differentiated Services [8] network have SLA guarantees for packet loss, delay, jitter and data transfer rate provided by their ISP. This section describes feasible methods for measuring these QoS parameters for each user in the domain. The calculated ratios are compared with the ratios granteed in SLA to detect the violations in jitter, bandwidth and data loss gaurantees. We proposed private method for each of them as follow:
Delay and Jitter metrics measurement
One-Way-Delay (OWD) is measured according to [6] either by recording timestamps of props packets or by dividing the Round Trip Time (RTT) by two. The main drawback of the first way is the non synchronization between the two ends: however, the asymmetric links gives us an approximated ratio when we use RTT. To avoid these drawbacks, we check delay jitter instead of delay parameter, because such drawbacks can affect in delay ratio computing, but they can not affect in jitter ratio computing. Jitter is defined as the change between OWD for a pair of packets selected within a flow in the evaluation interval [18] . That means for measuring jitter, delay must be computed first.
In this paper, we choose to compute OWD by dividing Two Way Delay (TWD) by two. TWD is the RTT which is computed by measuring the time from ingress to egress and back to ingress. The ingress edges forward the packet TWD information to the RMU. The RMU computes the OWD for every packet i traverses from ingress to egress as:
The computed values of OWD is used to compute the jitter as   
Where y x jitter is the jitter ratio computed for each flow y of user x over time interval ∆t, w is a small adaptation factor set to 0.1 for this computation. In conclusion, we infer that unwanted traffic may have injected and network services may have abused, when the jitter average of user x exceeds its jitter ratio guarantee in the SLA. 
Bandwidth metric measurement
According to [19] , when the DiffServ traffic exceeds the amount of bandwidth allocated for the customers specified by SLA, the traffic stream has reached burst size; consequently, the excess packets are drooped out of traffic profile. Otherwise, packets are considered as in traffic profile; similarly, when the bandwidth is not enough, the network traffic will be congested, and then the time required for transmitting data from one point to another will increase. In other wards, the traffic loss or transmitting delay can't occur as long as network bandwidth is not consumed. For these reasons, we consider the violation in bandwidth guarantee an evidence for unwanted traffic injection.
The objective of this paper in addition to the anomalous activities detection is the anomaly generator identification. A common fact that the user who consumes a bandwidth more than his portion, he certainly starves the others. To identify starvation source, we refer to every user who exceeds its guarantee of jitter in order to measure his throughput at all egress edges. Egress edges report RMU by the bandwidth consumed by each flow. The RMU aggregates the throughput of each user at all egress edges as the average of data transmission rate of that user. In this model, to easly measure the amount of bandwidth consumed by every flow, a mathematical mechanism can be used. According to [22] , theoretical when the network traffic loading is staple, every TCP flow transmitted through congested path will consume the same portion of bandwidth. In [23] 
 
where MSSi is the maximum segment size, RTTi is the packet round trip time, Pi is the drop probability of the packet, and C is a constant depends on the type of TCP. In order to apply Mathis's equation, we take into consideration all conditions and parameters assumptions. The equation will be applied on congested link between ingress and egress edges. This link is approximately symmetric. Flows of same user will be assumed as coming from the same source. Egress edges compute the amount of bandwidth consumed by flow i of user x and report it to the RMU. RMU classifies the flows which belong to user x and aggregates the bandwidth average of each user at all egress edges by using ESMA as
Where is the amount of bandwidth consumed by flow i of user x over time interval ∆t, weight is a small adaptation factor set to 0.1 for this computation. We conclude that unwanted traffic have been injected and 
Loss metric measurement
Although loss parameter checking is not included in this study, we explain how it can be measured to help in detecting service violations and resources theft. We will refer to edge-to-edge strategy as loss measurement mechanism between Provider Edges (PE). The ingress edge y reports RMU by all packets actually sent to egress edges over a time unit ∆t seconds for user x, ( 
where avg_Psent x is average number of packets sent by user x and avg_Prcvd x is average number of packets received for the same user x. Both these ratios are computed by RMU by using ESMA over the same interval. In conclusion, we infer that suspicious traffic may have injected, if this average loss exceeds the loss guarantee in the SLA.
Simulation result 7.1 Simulation setup
This section describes our simulation result for detecting the bandwidth consuming and service violations. We used the network simulator NS-2.33 [24] . The network topology used in our simulation comprises five edges routers with traffic conditioners and six core routers as illustrated in figure 5 . The link bandwidth capacity among all nodes is set to 10 Mbps. Propagation delay of all links is 5 ms. The simulation scenario is designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme for monitoring every customer on the provider edges. This scenario is simulated considering a Differentiated Service (DS) network domain. The domain accepts three service level specifications (SLS) for three users. The user uses multiple hosts to sends multiple flows via one or more ingress edges along the topology links. The details of SLS for users' flows are presented in table 2. 
Result and discussion
In the simulation, our proposed mechanism is investigated under light load; and when there is an excessive traffic by considering same scenario. Under the light load, the normal traffic is simulated as follow: 12 flows generated by user U1 through P0; 9 flows generated by user U1 through P1; 6 flows generated by user U2 through P2; and 3 flows generated by user U3 on P3. Figure 6 shows a normal situation between 0 and 6 seconds where network services are not violated and bandwidths are adequate to accommodate all incoming traffic. An attack is simulated on U1. At the seventh second, U1 starts to attack by sending an excessive traffic to R2. Link (8 -10) becomes the most congested and exhibits increased delay ratios, because it is a bottleneck for P0, P1 and P2. The delay in P3 does not increase because it is not congested. Figure 6 also shows that U3 does not exceed its delay ratio, while both U1 and U2 violate their SLS by exceeding delay portion guaranteed at 7-23 seconds. That is why; the violation is occurred by either U1 or U2. The delay average of the aggregated flows is computed for both U1 and U2. The delay measuring procedure discussed in section 6.1. Figure 6 shows that U1 exceeds its delay guarantee to more than 70 ms and U2 also exceed its delay guarantee to more than 40 ms.
As we discussed in section 6, OWD measurement has some drawbacks that make it not accurate. Due to those drawbacks, the result of delay measuring is considered not sufficient. Consequently, the crucial decision will be taken based on jitter measurement. Figure 7 and figure 8 depict the jitter measuring for U1 and U2 respectively. Figure 7 shows that the jitter average of U1 is normal before 7 second and after 23 second; however it exceeds 2.5 ms to more than 10 ms between 7 and 23 seconds. Figure 8 shows that the jitter average of U2 is round 2.5 ms at all simulation time. We consider the oscillatory jitter during the time 7-23 seconds is the evidence for service violation and bandwidth consume.
The violation in jitter guarantee which is depicted in figure 7 confirms the violation in delay which is depicted in figure 6 , while the absence of violation in jitter guarantee which is depicted in figure 8 negates the delay violation as depicted previously in figure 6 . So that U1 is considered an unwanted traffic generator, while U2 is considered a legitimated user. The following examples demonstrate that the absence of jitter violation in figure 8 negates the delay violation in figure 6 for the user U2. Arrived times of the first packet (T1) and arrived time of the next packet (T2) are assumed respectively as 25, 27.5. Jitter value is computed as: If packets delay value increases by x (x is the error ratio of OWD computing), jitter value will not change because of that as Figure 9 shows the approximated throughput of the aggregated flows for each user in the domain. We measure the throughput of U1 by aggregating the flows that follow P0 and P1, the throughput of U2 by aggregating the flows that follow P2 and the throughput of U3 by aggregating the flows that follow P3. Throughput measuring in Figure 9 depicts that U1 breaches its bandwidth guarantee by exceeding its average rate into more than 9 Mbps in the period (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) seconds; however, the throughput of U2 and U3 is in Delay Jitter normal rate. Despite of loss metric is not considered in this paper, loss ratio can be measured at the edge routers for each user. Loss measuring method is explained in section 5.3. Figure 9 . Users mean throughput.
Jitter = (T2 + x) -(T1 + x), Jitter = (27.5 + 7) -(25 + 7) = 2.5 ms
Conclusion and future work
Our mechanism presented in this paper can detect the risk before it occurs and identifies its generator and destination at the attack time, with no need to use traceback algorithms. This model is light-weight and does not require any extra components. we have demonstrated that through the simple architecture on section 4. All that we need is one device for RMU. In addition, this algorithm is efficient to detect SLA violations and to identify the user who is behind network services abusing. The simulation results indicate that using jitter is effective to avoid the drawbacks of using delay. Moreover, it is useful to remedy the increase of false alarms.
In future work, we will plan to add the DU unit which will be responsible for classifying the unwanted traffic into malicious, unsolicited and malformed traffic. And then determining which kind was behind service violations in the network. 
